Abstract-In this paper we present a code design technique which produces codes for syndrome coding which have better secrecy than the best error correcting codes. Code examples are given for the case where the number of parity bits of the code is equal to 15. The code design technique presented is based on extensions of the parity check matrix of a set of good equivocation codes of shorter length. It is also shown that syndrome coding can be implemented without the traditional syndrome look up table, enabling any length codes to be used. An efficient recursive method to calculate the equivocation rate for the binary symmetric channel (BSC) and any linear binary code is also presented. The design results show that the best equivocation codes (BEC) that are produced have better equivocation rate for the syndrome coding scheme compared to all previously published codes, including the best known codes (BKC).
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was proposed by Wyner [1] , and is a physical layer model that takes the security of transmitted information into account. In this model, Alice (transmitter), wishes to send a secret message M to Bob (legitimate receiver) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The wiretap channel model is shown in Fig. 1 , where the main channel (between Alice and Bob) is an error-free channel and the eavesdropper channel is a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with a probability of error (p e ) [2] . Secrecy is measured by the equivocation rate.
Wyner showed that the equivocation rate approaches unity to the eavesdropper if codes are used that have length extending to infinity, if the syndrome space is chosen to be smaller than the Shannon entropy of the binary symmetric channel (BSC). Chen and Vinck [3] also investigated the binary symmetric wiretap channel, and they showed that the secrecy capacity can be obtained by using random linear codes with syndrome coding. The syndrome coding scheme, whose basic idea is to convey information in the syndromes of a code so as to increase the communication security has been studied by several researchers. For example, Rouayheb and Soljanin [4] showed that network security can be achieved by using syndrome coding as an additional layer to a network code. Al-Hassan, Ahmed and Tomlinson [5] showed that the equivocation rate can be maximised on the eavesdropper side by using a combination of the technique of the McEliece cryptosystem using Best Known Codes (BKC) coupled with syndrome coding. Cohen and Zemor [6] analysed the information leakage of syndrome coding for the wiretap channel and proposed a Good codes can be designed by extending the parity check matrix of good codes as shown in [7] , [8] .
In this paper, we present an efficient recursive method for evaluating the equivocation rate of any linear, binary code when used in syndrome coding for the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). In addition, we present a code design technique to extend the binary linear [n, k] code to a [n + 1, k + 1] code to produce best equivocation codes. We present examples for the code where the number of parity bits of the code is equal to 15 (m = 15) where m = n − k. The code construction method for obtaining good equivocation codes is based on the observation that the syndrome probability mass function of a code extended in length is a function of the probability mass function of the original code, and good equivocation codes produce good extended codes. The design results for m = 15 show that these new best equivocation codes (BEC) have better equivocation rate compared to all previously published best error correcting codes, the best known codes (BKC) listed by Grassl [9] .
II. SYNDROME CODING SCHEME Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel [1] is :
which is the highest transmission rate that can be obtained while maintaining perfect secrecy. In this model, Alice (transmitter) wants to transmit a sequence of independent and uniformly distributed m-bit binary messages to Bob (legitimate receiver),M 
.., r and E BSC (i) represents a n-bit error vector generated by the binary symmetric channel, r is the block length. The syndrome coding scheme uses a (n, k, d) linear block code which guarantees to correct all error patterns of weight t, where t = (d − 1)/2 . All 2 m syndromes are used to send messages where m = n − k and not just the syndromes corresponding to weight t or less error patterns. For any linear block code there exist 2 m distinct minimum weight error patterns, the coset leaders, in which each pattern produces a distinct syndrome of the total 2 m syndromes. Therefore, these error patterns can be represented in a table of 2 m syndromes. In the traditional syndrome coding, the look up table for error patterns and syndromes is known by Alice, Bob and Eve. For long codes a syndrome table is impractical, but it is shown below that this look up table is unnecessary, and that the parity check matrix H of the code is sufficient taking into consideration the structure of H in systematic format. A block diagram for syndrome coding for a (n, k, d) linear block code is shown in Fig. 2 .
A. Encoding Algorithm
Alice starts the encryption process in order to generate a n-bit vector C 2 
Algorithm 1 Encoding Algorithm
Require:
Now, we show how to calculate the error pattern [E(i)] 1×n . Since the syndrome of any codeword is zero, any codeword added to an error pattern will produce the same syndrome. Hence Alice may produce the required syndrome by generating an n-bit zero padded message vector E(i), which consists of the original message M (i) which is m-bits long followed by k 0's where m = n − k. Algorithm 2 Legitimate Receiver's Decoder 
1×n is a random binary error vector which depends on the crossover probability pe of BSC. Assuming Eve uses the same type of decoder that has been used by Bob, the following steps explains how she gets the estimated messageM (i) from the corrupted vector D(i):
Eve recovers an estimate of the messageM (i) 3: returnM (i)
III. CALCULATION OF THE SECRECY ACHIEVED BY SYNDROME CODING
The secrecy realised by syndrome coding is measured by the eavesdropper decoder output equivocation,
where H(S e (i)) is the entropy of Se(i). The simplifications in equations (2) and (3) are due to M (i) being uniformly distributed and independent of S e (i). The equivocation is calculated after deriving the probability mass function of the syndromes due to errors from the BSC, p(S e (i)) and is a function of the code being used through the parity check matrix of the code.
A. Code Representation
Any binary linear (n, k, d) code is defined by its (k × n) generator matrix G or by its (m × n) parity check matrix H. The best equivocation codes are constructed by designing the parity check matrix of the code. H can be defined by representing each column of H by an integer, b i , in the range 0 to (2 n−k − 1). The binary parity check matrix of a code of length n is defined by n.k binary integers, the first m columns of H is an identity matrix if H is in systematic form, as shown below: 
B. Evaluation of the syndrome probability distribution
The code construction technique that produces codes with good equivocation is based on the realisation that the syndrome probability mass function (pmf) of a new extended code is a function of the probability mass function of the original code and good equivocation codes produce good extended codes. For Eve, there are 2 n possible error patterns, e(i), occur for each transmitted vector C(i) 1×n . These error patterns occur with probability:
where w(i) is the weight of e(i). Each error pattern results in one of the 2 m syndromes being produced.
As the code is linear, for each syndrome there are 2 k error patterns that produce the same syndrome and the probability of each syndrome due to all possible error patterns is given by:
where δ() is the Dirac function and
This method for evaluating the equivocation works well for short codes (n < 40), but for the long codes it is impracticable because it involves the evaluation of 2 n error patterns. Due to the limitation of this method, the probability distribution of the syndromes may be determined recursively, this method leads to reduce the number of terms from 2 n to 2 m as shown in the following theorem. Theorem : The probability mass function (pmf) of S j for j=0 to 2 m -1 can be defined as p(S j ) = β(j) where β(j) are coefficients of the probability generating function using the Z transform, denoted as p z (S) and p z (S) only depends on the columns of the parity check matrix H and the probability error of the binary symmetric channel p e .
where b i are the integers representations of the columns of H and exponent sums of powers of Z are added modulo 2. Proof: Any error pattern may be represented as a sum of single bit error events:
where e i =1 with probability p e and e i =0 with probability 1 − p e . The linearity of the syndrome coding scheme means that the syndrome resulting from any error pattern is the linear sum of the syndromes for each bit error position:
Since the probabilities of e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n are independent, the probability of S e (i) is the product of the probabilities of n separate error events. By adding the coefficients of the same powers of Z results in the coefficients, β j , the number of terms to be reduced from 2 n to 2 m . If the columns of H of the shortened code of length r are taken from i = 0 to r − 1 and the pmf generating function of the shortened code is represented as p z (S r ) then
. . Now, we can extend the length of the original code from r to r + 1 by adding one column to its parity check matrix H, the pmf generating function of the extended code r + 1 is given by
(13) Denoting the β(j) coefficients of the original code of length r, as β r (j) then
and for extended code r + 1
Adding together the coefficients of the same powers of Z in the coefficients, β r (j) to obtain β r+1 (j), simplifies the above equation to
From equation (16), it is clear that the syndrome pmf of the new code of length r + 1 is equal to the syndrome pmf of the original code of length r weighted by 1 − p e plus a permuted syndrome pmf of the original code of length r, weighted by p e . The permutation arises from the results of the modulo 2 additions j⊕b r . This leads to the conclusion that the syndrome pmf of the code can be obtained recursively, starting with the generating function p z (S 1 ), determining p z (S 2 ) then p z (S 3 ) through to p z (S n ). The syndrome pmf of each (n,k,d) code of length r is stored and the syndrome pmf for each extended code of length r + 1 is determined using the equation (16) which makes for a fast algorithm. It is also apparent that good equivocation codes will also produce good equivocation codes when extended in length.
IV. CODE DESIGN TECHNIQUE
To produce a best equivocation codes the pmf of the syndromes should be as uniform as possible. Since the eavesdropper channel is a binary symmetric channel, for low values of p e the equivocation is dominated by error patterns of low weight. To produce best equivocation codes, we must take into account the following observations: 1) If the error pattern has low weight, then the probability of the error events is high. If each error pattern produces different syndrome sums, then this makes the pmf of the syndromes become more uniform. 2) By using the systematic format of the parity check matrix H, the packed integers of any information bit cannot have a weight less than d − 1, where d is the minimum Hamming distance of the code. Otherwise the codeword formed from that information bit alone will have weight less than d. 3) If any column of the parity check matrix H is repeated, a weight 2 error event will produce a zero syndrome, that leads to a non uniform pmf of the syndrome. The following code design algorithm shows how to extend an [n, k] code into [n + 1, k + 1] by adding the best column to the original parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code.
Algorithm 4 Code Design Technique
syndrome pmf of (n, k)code
integer sequence(columns) of H Require: (n, k, m, pe) code parameters and error probability of BSC Require: C in initial inequivalent codes of the highest equivocation rate 1: Generate (b r ) generating between 3 and 2 m − 1 Ensure:
apply equations (16) and (17)
calculate the equivocation of [n + 1, k + 1] code 6: EqN ← Eq/m calculate the Normalised equivocation 7: return (b r ), EqN, C out extended inequivalent codes, which are ranked by equivocation in descending order
The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follows: 1) Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code (n, k) from equation(14). 2) Represent the parity check matrix H of the (n, k) code in the systematic format:
Extend H with one integer (b r ) by generating randomly all possible integers between 3 and 2 m − 1 with the constraint that there are no repeated integers included in the original H. This ensures that the minimum Hamming distance of each extended code is at least 3. 4) Eliminate all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivocation rate for each remaining code by using equation(4). 5) Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in descending order, and select a best codes subset. These codes are used as the initial input for the next extension round.
V. RESULTS
By using the code design technique above, the best equivocation codes have been determined for m = 15. As a result of the large number of codes we only present here in Table 1 codes which provide at least 80% secrecy. The minimum Hamming distance (d) and the equivocation rate (Eq.) for a BSC error probability of p e = 0.05 is given for each code. The equivocation rates of the corresponding best error correcting codes previously published, the (BKC) codes listed by Grassl [9] with the same n and m are also given in Table 1 (in parentheses). The results show that significant improvements have been achieved on the equivocation rate for the best equivocation codes compared with best known codes. Fig. 4 shows the equivocation rate Eq. as a function of probability of error p e of best equivocation and best known codes for n = 82 at different values of p e . It shows that the equivocation rate of BECs has been increased by a large margin compared with BKCs not only for p e = 0.05 but also for other values of p e .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a code design technique for obtaining best equivocation codes and also presented a method of implementing syndrome coding without the need for a syndrome look up table. The best equivocation codes for the syndrome coding scheme that achieve at least 80% secrecy to an eavesdropper using the BSC with an error probability of 0.05 are presented in Table 1 . In addition, a recursive method for the evaluation of the probability mass function of the syndromes of a code which depends only on the columns of the parity check matrix and the probability of error of the binary symmetric channel has been presented. The results obtained show that the equivocation rate of the new best equivocation codes exceeds by a large margin the equivocation rates of the best error correcting codes, previously published. 
